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use#OAPINFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
ABSTRACT. Thispaperdevelopsatheoryofoptimalinstitutionalstructureforstaggered-
term (overlapping generations) organizations such as legislative bodies. Our model
is a simple stochastic game of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships.
Our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders
at the “constitutional moment”. First, they will agree to institute a mechanism that
endows (imperfectly informed) legislators with information about the history of
play. Second, we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent
to the structure of legislative procedures.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D72, D78, H11.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Motivation and overview. Imagine two agents, each employees of separate
divisions of a ﬁrm, who interact each period to allocate a surplus to be shared by
their respective divisions. The subordinates are hired by their respective divisions
for two periods at a ﬁxed salary. Each subordinate’s performance in the surplus
allocation task in the two periods is then assessed, and he is either reappointed or
ﬁred. One subordinate, however, was hired in period t   1 and the other in period
t. The former, therefore, comes up for renewal at the end of period t, while the latter
does not face a renewal decision until the end of period t + 1. Thus, the agents are
of different “types” — one EARLY (and thus not up for renewal this period) and
one LATE (up for renewal this period). The types are determined by time-varying
characteristics, not immutable properties of the individual agents.
Many organizations possess this staggered-term feature. In the present paper we
willuseasarunningexampleaprominentclassofpoliticalorganization—staggered-
term legislatures. Upper chambers of many national and provincial legislatures
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possess this feature. The United States Senate, for example, consists of 100 sena-
tors, each elected for six years and then eligible for reelection. They are partitioned
into three approximately equal classes, with one class of senators coming up for
(re)election every two years.
Strategic interaction among the agents is enriched in interesting ways by stag-
gered terms. One complication that we emphasize is related to information. Agents
come and go, as some fail to have their employment renewed, obscuring exactly
who knows what about the past history of the organization and, in particular, about
past patterns of strategic interaction. The ability of contemporaneous agents to
condition their actions on this history is confounded as a result. Another compli-
cation has to do with the manner in which assessments are carried out by prin-
cipals. If a supervisor or an electoral constituency assesses past performance in
time-dependent ways — for example, weighing recent performance more heavily
than performance farther in the past — then agents will have type-dependent mo-
tivations each period; the incentives of EARLY types will differ from those of LATE
types.
Thispaperexploresdynamicstrategicinteractioninprincipal-agentrelationships.
Equilibrium behavior is affected by the staggered timing of agent assessment, the
time-dependent way in which principals assess performance, and the amount of
information that agents in any period have about the history of play. After exploring
the game among agents, we step back and analyze how the principals design the
game in the ﬁrst instance. The world we study is one in which neither principals
nor agents can commit ex ante: principals cannot promise to reappoint agents when
the latter come up for renewal, and agents cannot commit to one another to behave
in particular ways over time.
In the next three sections we develop a baseline dynamic model involving two
agents engaged each period in a divide-the-cake exercise. Each agent has the same
ﬁxed term length and the same compensation per term, but a distinct start date and
hence a distinct renewal date. Principals decide whether to renew or terminate their
respective agents probabilistically on the basis of past performance in delivering
cake to them. We examine two informational regimes: the default informational
regime in which agents in each period have imperfect information about the his-
tory of play, and a richer informational regime (made possible by the creation of an
appropriate institutionalized mechanism) through which agents are endowed with
information about all the important bits of the history of play. The strategic inter-
action — the game form so to speak — is taken as exogenously ﬁxed. Then, in
section 5, we relax this restriction, inquiring how principals (the founding fathers),INFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 3
in a “constitutional moment,” would determine the institutional structure for sub-
sequent strategic interaction. We also explore the robustness of such constitutional
decisions to renegotiation (“constitutional amendments”).
In section 6 we show how our baseline model of two principals and their respec-
tive agents extends to multiple principals each with multiple agents and, in section
7, we brieﬂy develop an analytical description of the US Senate as a quintessential
staggered-term organization. We conclude in section 8 with a discussion of some of
the main assumptions and features of our model, and a brief discussion of some di-
rections for future research. Intuitions for our theoretical propositions are provided
in the body of the paper, but proofs are placed in the appendix.
1.2. Our contribution. This paper develops a theory of optimal institutional struc-
ture for staggered-term, or overlapping generations (OLG), organizations such as
legislative bodies (e.g., US Senate and Indian Rajya Sabha). In the process of doing
so, we establish several results concerning the properties of equilibriumoutcomes of
certain kinds of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships. Our two main
results characterize for legislatures (but also other organizations) the institutional
structure that maximizes the joint expected payoffs of the principals (one from each
electoral district) at the “constitutional moment” when the legislature is founded.
First, the principals will agree to institute a mechanism that endows (imperfectly
informed) legislators in each period with all the information required about the his-
tory of play in the legislature. Transparency of agent-actions to agents (in order
to enable agents to hold each other to account) is a key and robust feature of the
principal-optimal institutional structure. This result and the model from which it is
derived shows that transparency as a solution to moral hazard problems — the con-
ventional interpretation in the literature — is not the only purpose it serves. In our
model, transparency is the means by which long-term relationships among agents
are sustained; indeed, it may not even matter whether strategic interaction among
agents is transparent to their principals. Principals will institute a mechanism that
endows legislators with information about the history of play, because otherwise
(in the default informational regime of imperfect information) the equilibrium be-
haviour of agents is detrimental to the principals.1
1Formally, we show that with imperfect information about past actions, equilibrium behaviour is
necessarily in Markov strategies. Given this key result, we then show that the unique equilibrium
in such a world generates extremal consumption paths. For principals with concave preferences,
however, relatively smoother consumption paths dominate. These are sustainable in equilibrium
when a mechanism provides legislators with sufﬁcient information about past actions to sustain
intertemporal cooperation credibly. We show that this result holds for any allocations of agenda
power, which establishes the central importance to the principals of instituting a mechanism that
provides agents with transparency about the history of play.4 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
Second, we show circumstances in which the principals are indifferent to partic-
ular details of institutional procedure. At the constitutional moment principals are
concerned primarily with ensuring that legislators can hold each other to account,
no more no less; they do not care about the sequence of bargaining, the allocation
of proposal power, etc. There are, however, some circumstances in which principal-
optimality entails a particular set of procedural rules in combination with the insti-
tutionalized mechanism that endows agents with information about history.
Another of our main results derives from the manner in which principals judge
theperformanceoftheirrespectiveagents, inparticularaformofrecencybiasaffect-
ing this judgment. Equilibrium outcomes in the kind of multi-principal, multi-agent
dynamic relationship that underlies our model display a strict “back loading” of
cake which arises due to the principal’s query, “What have you done for me lately?”
The result implies an equilibrium electoral cycle.
We contribute to two main literatures, namely, the political agency and the leg-
islative policy-making literatures (for a review of these literatures, see Persson and
Tabellini 2000). The former was initiated by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), while
the latter by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Both literatures are now fairly large and still
growing.2
2. THE BASELINE MODEL
2.1. The structure. We consider an inﬁnitely lived legislative body consisting of
two legislators, each elected from a separate electoral district. A legislator’s term in
ofﬁce consists of two periods followed by the possibility of reelection — there are
no term limits. Furthermore, legislators from the two districts have staggered terms
of ofﬁce. This means that at the end of each period only one legislator comes up for
reelection.
The legislature is founded in period  1, when the “founding fathers” (two prin-
cipals, one from each district) jointly determine the institutional structure of the
legislature (such as its procedural rules and informational features) as described
in subsection 2.5. At this constitutional moment, there are no legislators (agents)
present.3
Thelegislaturestartsoperatingfromperiod0onwards. Ineachperiod t  { 1,2,3,...},
the two legislators are different “types”. One of the legislators was reelected, or
elected for the ﬁrst time, at the beginning of this period. This legislator is therefore
2A more recent and comprehensive exposition and discussion of the political agency literature can
be found in Besley (2006). For a recent model that represents the current state-of-art in legislative
policy-making, see Coate and Battagalini (2007).
3For a discussion of the choice between staggered-term and simultaneous-term legislative bodies,
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in the ﬁrst period of his two-period term in ofﬁce. The other legislator was reelected,
or elected for the ﬁrst time, at the beginning of period t   1. He is currently in the
second (and last) period of his two-period term in ofﬁce. For expositional conve-
nience, we denote the former type of legislator by EARLY and the latter type by
LATE.4
In period 0, matters are a little different as this is the ﬁrst period of operation of
the legislature. In this period, a legislator from each district is elected. Given that
the terms of ofﬁce are staggered, one of them is randomly selected to be the EARLY
type (and thus begins a two-period term in ofﬁce), while the other is selected to
be the LATE type (and thus comes up for reelection at the end of this very period
having served only a one-period term in ofﬁce).5
The period-t EARLY legislator is the period-(t + 1) LATE legislator. At the end
of period t, the period-t LATE legislator faces his electorate (his period-t principal).
He either is reelected or replaced by a challenger.6 If reelected, then he becomes the
period-(t + 1) EARLY legislator; otherwise the challenger, a newly minted legisla-
tor, is the period-(t + 1) EARLY legislator. Our model of elections is described in
subsection 2.2. Although the legislators are not in different generations as such, as
is the case in standard OLG models, our structure is similar in a few important re-
spects to such models, especially in terms of the relative incentives of the two types
of legislators.
The policy context in each period concerns the sharing of an economic surplus.
We stylize this as the allocation of cake (or pork) between the two districts. In each
period t, the period-t EARLY and LATE legislators negotiate over the partition of
a cake (the pork barrel). Note that the legislative task is exclusively one of dis-
tribution. There are no public goods in this model, and the surplus is treated as
exogenous; we defer discussion of this point to section 8. The bargaining procedure
(which in particular embodies the distribution of legislative proposal power) is de-
scribed in subsection 2.3. If an agreement is struck, then the agreed shares of the
cake ﬂow to the districts. The legislators receive no direct beneﬁt from any portion
4Note that “types” refer to period-dependent characteristics of legislators, and not, as is standard in
economic theory, to some immutable characteristic.
5The US Senate operated exactly like this. In its opening session in 1790, the method of lots was em-
ployed to distribute senators in this staggered-term legislature across types, subject to the constraint
that both of a state’s senators could not be of the same type. Repeated randomizations were held as
new states were admitted to the Union. A description of these randomizations and their results over
time is found at http://www.thegreenpapers.com/Hx/SenateClasses.html
6Challengers are not modelled as players in our framework. It is implicitly assumed that a challenger
exists and that he has not previously served in the legislature. This means that a legislator who
fails to get reelected cannot be a future challenger; he withdraws from legislative politics in that
eventuality. Apart from these differences in legislative experience, there are no other differences
between a challenger and a legislator seeking reelection.6 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
of this cake. A legislator simply receives a ﬁxed payoff (salary) b > 0 in each term
he serves in ofﬁce. Any share of the cake that he negotiates for his district, however,
may help his reelection prospects.
The structure and timing is summarized in Figure 1. We now turn to a description
of elections, bargaining, information and the founding fathers’ problem (where we
also discuss the “renegotiation” issue mentioned in Figure 1).
  time
Period  1  1  1 Period 0 0 0 Periods t   1 t   1 t   1
Constitutional Moment: Type Allocation: Legislative Business:
Procedural Rules and
Informational Features.
Elections; Allocation of Types;
Renegotiation?; Policy Negotiations.
Elections and Policy Negotiations.
FIGURE 1. Structure and timing.
2.2. Elections. Let   denote the probability that an arbitrary legislator (in an arbi-
trary period) is reelected. We explicitly capture two key ideas about this reelection
probability. Our ﬁrst idea is that voters care about the legislator’s past performance
in ofﬁce when deciding whether or not to reelect him. We formalize this idea by
positing that   depends on the amounts of cake he obtained for his constituents
during his most recent two-period term in ofﬁce. With a slight abuse of notation,
we write this as  (xE, xL), where xE and xL are the amounts of cake obtained by the
legislator when EARLY and LATE, respectively, in his most recent two-period term
of ofﬁce.7
It is natural to assume that receiving more cake does not make the voters worse
off, and thus does not decrease a legislator’s chances of getting reelected. However,
it may be that for some increases, the chances are unaffected. Hence:
Assumption 1 (Weak monotonicity). The probability   that a legislator is reelected is
non-decreasing in each of its two arguments.
The second central idea we adopt about the election outcome is the notion that
voters engage in a particular form of retrospective assessment. Known in the psy-
chological literature as the recency effect, voters ask “What have you done for me
lately?” whichweabbreviatewiththeacronymWHYDFML(pronouncedwhid’ﬁml).
We adopt an especially weak form of recency effect: the probability of reelection is
higher if a legislator receives the entire surplus LATE rather than EARLY. Hence:
7Note that for the period-0 LATE legislator, xE = 0, by deﬁnition. In fact, the probability of reelection
function for the period-0 LATE legislator could, in principle, differ from  (0,xL). However, because
it does not affect our results, for expositional convenience we ignore the difference.INFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 7
Assumption 2 (Weak recency effect). The probability   that a legislator is reelected sat-
isﬁes  (0,1)    (1,0).
For some of our results, we need to impose a restriction involving the maxi-
mum and minimum feasible reelection probabilities, requiring that  (0,0) not be
too small unless  (1,1) is large:
Assumption 3. The probability of reelection   satisﬁes  (0,0)   1    (1,1).
Note that Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that  (1,1)   0.5. In summary, our model
ofelectionsischaracterizedentirelybytheprobability-of-reelectionfunction   satis-
fying Assumptions 1-3 (A1-A3 henceforth). Thus, the probability-of-reelection func-
tionisexogenouslygiven(i.e., inparticularthevotingruleandthevoters’behaviour
are not explicitly modelled).
2.3. Bargaining. The procedural rules that inﬂuence the determination of the nego-
tiated partition of the unit-size cake are a key part of the institutional structure of
the legislature, pinning down the allocation of power (proposal power in particular)
between the two legislators. Our framework abstracts from many of the details of
real institutions through which power is derived (such as committees), capturing
the allocation of power in a simple manner.
We posit a random proposer, “take-it-or-leave-it-offer” format. With probability
    [0,1] the EARLY legislator makes an offer of a partition of the unit-size cake to
the LATE legislator, and with the complementary probability 1    it is the LATE
legislator who makes an offer to the EARLY legislator. If the offer is accepted, agree-
ment is struck. But if the offer is rejected, then bargaining terminates, no agreement
is reached, and no cake is obtained (in the period in question) by either district.8
We adopt the convention that an offer designates the share going to the proposer.
It is therefore sometimes convenient to use the word “demand” rather than “offer”
(Morelli 1999). The probability   captures the relative proposal power of the legis-
lators. If it equals one-half, then power is not type-contingent; otherwise it is. If
  = 0 then the LATE legislator has all the power, while the exact opposite is the
case if   = 1. Each type of legislator has some power if 0 <   < 1. As   increases
more power is vested in the EARLY legislator. We adopt the following regularity
assumptions:
Assumption 4 (Tie-breaking).
(i) When indifferent between accepting or rejecting an offer, a legislator accepts it.
8In section 8 we brieﬂy comment on the robustness of our main results to alternative bargaining
procedures (such as alternating-offers procedures), and on the consequences of allowing proposal
power to depend on legislators’ experience or seniority.8 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
(ii) When indifferent between making one of several offers, a legislator selects the offer which
allocates the largest share of the cake to him.
For future reference, it may be noted that the expected payoff to a legislator who is
reelected on each occasion with a constant probability     [0,1) equals b/(1    ).
Notice that, without much loss of generality, we do not endow legislators with a
discount factor.9
2.4. Information. How much information does any legislator have in any given pe-
riod about the history of play? The issue is especially pertinent here since every two
periods a legislator faces reelection, and with positive probability he is replaced by
a newly minted legislator. While the legislature is an inﬁnitely lived body, operating
over an indeﬁnite number of periods, legislators come and go. As such a legislator
may not know all of the important or relevant bits of the history of play at any given
period. Indeed, the default informational regime would be one in which legislators
have imperfect information about the history of play. Such a default regime could
however be altered by purposeful design: a mechanism could be instituted that
provides information about the important bits of the history of play. This could be
instituted by the founding fathers at the constitutional moment (if of course doing
so serves their joint interests).
10
In what follows, we will therefore be interested in studying the properties of the
equilibrium of our model under two alternative informational regimes: the default
regime in which legislators have imperfect information about history, and a richer
informational regime in which legislators (through the aid of an institutionalized
mechanism) have all the information about history that they need. In order to sim-
plify the equilibrium analysis, but without affecting our main results, we formally
identify the latter informational regime with one in which legislators have perfect
information, that is:
9To be precise, there is a potential but minor loss of generality. By not entertaining discounting, we
need to assume that the reelection probability does not take the value of one. While such an assump-
tion seems quite plausible, it does however rule out the cut-off voting rules used in the political
agency literature in which a legislator is reelected with probability one if he performs sufﬁciently
well (and fails to get reelected otherwise). The reelection probability function   can of course ap-
proximate such a cut-off rule. We have chosen to proceed as we have in order to avoid carrying
around an extra parameter (a discount factor for the legislators).
10The U.S. Constitution requires each chamber of the legislature to “keep a Journal of its Proceed-
ings, and from time to time publish the same...” (Article I, Section 5). While we will return to this
point, we mention this here as an example of an institutionalized mechanism providing (relatively)
”untainted” information about history distinct from that which might be self-servingly reported con-
temporaneously by self-interested agents. That is, privately collected historical information (e.g., a
private diary) transmitted to a new agent is not a substitute for untainted public information because
it is unveriﬁable and therefore subject to misrepresentation.INFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 9
Assumption 5 (Perfect information). For any t, the actions taken then are known by
legislators in each and every subsequent period s > t. That is, any legislator in any period
has full knowledge of the entire history of play.
We deﬁne the default informational regime of imperfect information as follows:
Assumption 6 (Imperfect information). For any t there exists a ﬁnite T > t such that
legislators in period T and onwards do not know of the actions taken by the legislators in
periods s   t.
This formalization of imperfect information is implied, for example, by agents
with ﬁnite memory, the length of which could vary across legislators. A6 implies
that information about a past action is lost for sure some ﬁnite number of periods in
the future.11
An altogether different kind of information concerns what a legislator knows
about the game form, the payoffs and various parameters:
Assumption 7 (Complete information). There is common knowledge amongst all legis-
lators about the game itself, including whether A5 or A6 holds.
2.5. Founding fathers’ problem. At the constitutional moment in period  1, the
founding fathers select the institutional structure of the legislature. In particular,
they jointly choose (a) the allocation of proposal power (value of ), and (b) between
keeping the default informational regime of imperfect information (A6 holds) or
instituting a mechanism that would enable legislators to have information about all
the important history (A5 holds).
The choices are made so as to optimize over the founding fathers’ joint interests.
We assume that the founding fathers respectively represent the interests of the two
districts, and that for each district, the voters across time have the same preferences.
We can therefore identify one inﬁnitely lived principal per district. Let ui(c) denote
the per-period utility obtained by the principal from district i (i = 1,2) when her
consumption is c in the period in question, and let  i < 1 denote her per-period
discount factor. We assume that ui is strictly increasing and strictly concave in c.
The principals’ (or founding fathers’) joint expected payoffs take into account that
in period 0 it will be randomly determined (with equal probability) as to which dis-
trict’s legislator is to be the EARLY type and which the LATE type. Furthermore,
11The formalization of imperfect information deﬁned in A6 is adapted from Bhaskar (1998) who
studies a version of Samuelson’s OLG model with imperfect information. We discuss the game-
theoretic OLG literature, including Bhaskar (1998), in section 8; we also entertain alternative for-
mulations of imperfect information there. It may however be noted here that with the exception
of Bhaskar’s work, the literature assumes, without question, that players have perfect information
about history.10 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
these payoffs depend on the equilibrium outcome of the game once the legislature
starts operating at the start of period 0, which in general vary according to the se-
lected procedural rules and information structure. These equilibria are derived in
sections 3 and 4 according to whether there is perfect information or imperfect in-
formation. Section 5 then studies the principals’ period  1 problem. We will also
ask whether the selected institutions (relating to procedures and information) are
renegotiation-proof at the beginning of period 0, after the veil is lifted as to which
district’s legislator is EARLY and which is LATE.
This completes the description of our baseline model, which is a stochastic game
with a countably inﬁnite number of agents, but only two agents are active in any
one period, and the number of periods for which an agent is active is determined
endogenously.12
3. INTERTEMPORAL COOPERATION UNDER PERFECT INFORMATION
In this section we study the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE henceforth) of our
baseline model with Assumption 5 and for an arbitrary value of EARLY’s proposal
probability,  . That is, we suppose that at the constitutional moment in period  1
the principals selected some value for   and instituted a mechanism that endows
legislators with relevant information about history. Given this informationally rich
environment, our analysis focuses on addressing the following question: Can agent-
optimal outcome paths be sustained in any SPE? Roughly speaking (a precise deﬁni-
tion is stated below), an agent-optimal outcome path is a path of play of our stochas-
tic game that maximizes the legislators’ joint expected payoffs. The presumption is
that while there are a multiplicity of SPE in our stochastic game with perfect infor-
mation, legislators will cooperate to maximize their joint payoffs.
We establish that an agent-optimal outcome path is a SPE path for any alloca-
tion of bargaining power and for any probability of reelection function satisfying
our three mild assumptions, A1–A3. Legislators credibly sustain agent-optimal out-
come paths via intertemporal cooperation, and with the credible threat of inﬂicting
maximal punishments on deviators. It is because of the latter that the allocation of
bargaining power is irrelevant, as is the magnitude of the reelection probability as-
sociated with the agent-optimal outcome path (subject to A3).
The analysis in this section rests crucially on the assumption that legislators have
perfect information about the history of play, since the equilibria constructed here
require that to be the case. In summary, then, the key message of this section can
12Our stochastic game falls outside of the classes of stochastic games studied in the current literature
(see, for example, Friedman 1986, Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, and Dutta 1995). Thus, we cannot
appeal to or apply results from that literature. However, some of our main results are derived using
methods and ideas borrowed from that literature and from the theory of inﬁnitely repeated games.INFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 11
be put as follows: When legislators possess all the information they need about history
(which is made possible via the institutionalized information-providing mechanism), proce-
dural rules and proposal power are irrelevant, as is the nature of the reelection probability
function (subject to A1–A3).
Our analysis is based on the insightful methodology laid down by Abreu (1988).
The key to it is to derive the “optimal penal code”, that is, the worst SPE payoffs to
each and every legislator. Section 3.1 is devoted to their derivation. Our main result
is then established in section 3.2. It is derived on the fundamental observation, ﬁrst
made by Abreu, that an outcome path is a SPE path if and only if it is sustained in a
SPE in which any unilateral deviation from it by a player immediately moves play
into that player’s worst SPE.
3.1. Worst punishments. In any Nash equilibrium, each legislator’s expected pay-
off is no less that his minmax payoff. This is the worst possible expected payoff
that all other legislators can hold him down to. It involves them rejecting all offers
from him when he has proposal power and demanding the whole cake when they
have proposal power. Hence, a legislator’s minmax payoff is b/[1  (0,0)], which,
given the symmetric nature of our stochastic game, is the same for every legislator
(see Lemma 1).
TheworstSPEforanarbitrarylegislatorcanbeconvenientlydeﬁnedbytwopaths
Q1 and Q2, and two transition rules T1 and T2. If the initial path is Qi (i = 1,2), then
any legislator from district i is held to his minmax payoff.
The path Qi: Each legislator from district i always (i.e., in any period, for any
history, and whether he is EARLY or LATE) offers the whole cake to the legislator
from district j (j  = i), and accepts all offers. Each legislator from district j always
demands the whole cake, and only accepts an offer that allocates to him the whole
of it.13
The transition rule Ti: If, when play is on path Qi, a legislator from district j
accepts an offer in which he is allocated less than the whole cake, then immediately
(from the start of the next period onwards) play switches to path Qj. For any other
deviation on path Qi, play remains on this path.
Lemma 1 (The worst SPE). Given Assumptions 1–3, 5 and 7, the strategies implicitly
deﬁned by the pair of paths (Q1, Q2) and the pair of transition rules (T1, T2) are subgame
perfect. If the initial path is Qi, then the expected payoff in this SPE to any legislator from
district i (i = 1,2) is his minmax payoff, b/[1    (0,0)].
13When we say “each” legislator from district i, it should be understood that at any time t there is
only one such legislator actively playing in the game, but the claim applies as well to any legislator
that may replace him.12 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
Proof. In the appendix.  
The proof of Lemma 1 involves checking that no legislator can undertake a prof-
itable deviation from either of the two paths. For example, Assumptions 2 and 3
respectively help ensure that an EARLY legislator and a LATE legislator from dis-
trict i cannot proﬁtably deviate from path Qj when offered almost all (but not the
whole) of the cake.
Lemma 1 has deﬁned two extremal SPE according to whether the initial path is Q1
or Q2. The former is the worst SPE path for any legislator from district 1, while the
latter is the worst SPE path for any legislator from district 2. Notice that when a leg-
islator from district i is meted out maximal punishment (he never gets any cake), the
legislator from the other district (who is doing the punishing) likes it as he obtains
the whole cake. Interestingly, these extremal equilibria exist for any feasible value
of ; i.e., the worst punishment paths are sustainable as SPE paths irrespective of the
structure of the procedural rules (given, of course, an institutionalized mechanism
that endows legislators with enough information about history to enable them to
credibly sustain intertemporal cooperation).
3.2. Incentive-compatible, agent-optimal outcomes. Given the underlying sym-
metric and stationary structure of our stochastic game, the legislators’ joint expected
payoffs are maximized with an outcome path in which in each period the partition
of the unit-size cake is contingent on at most the type of the legislator who is ran-
domly selected to make the offer (but is otherwise independent of time and history).
Fix, therefore, such an arbitrary outcome path, Q(kE,kL): in each period, the legis-
lator who is selected to propose demands a share kE   [0,1] if he is EARLY, and a
share kL   [0,1] if he is LATE, and the demand is accepted. The expected payoff
P(kE,kL) to an arbitrary legislator at the beginning of any period when he is EARLY
from this outcome path is P(kE,kL)=b/[1    (kE,kL)], where14
(1)  (kE,kL)= 2 (kE,1  kE)+ (1   ) (kE,kL)+ + +
(1   )  (1   kL,1  kE)+(1   )2 (1   kL,kL).
14The expression for this expected probability is made up of four terms corresponding to four pos-
sible outcomes. Each such outcome is determined by the realizations in each of the two periods of
who the proposer is. For example, with probability  2, in each of the two periods it is the EARLY
legislator who is selected. That means that the legislator in question gets to propose when EARLY
but not when LATE, and so in this eventuality his probability of reelection is  (kE,1  kE).INFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 13
An agent-optimal outcome path, Q(k 
E,k 
L), is characterized by a pair of numbers
(k 
E,k 
L) which maximizes P(kE,kL) (or, equivalently, the expected probability of re-
election,  (kE,kL)) over the set of all (kE,kL)   [0,1]   [0,1].15
We now establish that any agent-optimal outcome path is a SPE path. Following
Abreu (1988), this result is achieved by constructing a SPE in which any unilateral
deviation from the (initial) path Q(k 
E,k 
L) by a legislator from district i immediately
moves play onto the path Qi (which is the worst SPE for such a legislator).
Proposition 1 (Agent-optimal SPE). Given Assumptions 1–3, 5 and 7, the agent-optimal
outcome path Q(k 
E,k 
L), deﬁned above, is a SPE path. The expected payoff to any legislator
in any agent-optimal outcome path is
P(k 
E,k 
L)=
b
1    (k 
E,k 
L)
with  (k 
E,k 
L)= max
(kE,kL) [0,1] [0,1]
 (kE,kL)
where  (kE,kL) is deﬁned in (1).
Proof. In the appendix.  
Proposition1establishesthatanagent-optimaloutcomepathisaSPEpathforany
allocation of proposal power and for any reelection probability function satisfying
the three mild assumptions, A1–A3. The sustainability of this path as a SPE does not
hinge either on the structure of the procedural rules ( ) or on the magnitude of the
reelection probability associated with it ( ), subject only to the implication of A3
that  (k 
E,k 
L) cannot be too small unless  (1,1) is large. All this is made possible
because the agent-optimal outcome path is being sustained by the optimal penal
code (i.e., the worst SPE).
Theexistenceoftheseequilibriarequireslegislatorstopossessperfectinformation
about the history of play (A5). In short, then, neither the structure of procedural rules
nor the nature of the reelection probability function (subject to A1-A3) is relevant for the
existence of an agent-optimal SPE when there exists an institutionalized mechanism that
endows legislators with all the information they need about history.
It should however be noted that since  (kE,kL) depends on  and  , so in general
will the agent-optimal outcome (k 
E,k 
L) and the legislator’s agent-optimal expected
payoff P(k 
E,k 
L). But without imposing additional structure on the probability of
reelection function  , it is not possible in general to establish any results concerning
that dependence. We are able, however, to establish two results about the agent-
optimal outcome when   is concave. We ﬁrst show for concave   that the agent-
optimal outcome and the legislator’s expected payoff are independent of :
15Existence is guaranteed since   is bounded and the feasible set is compact. Depending on the
properties of  , there may however exist more than one agent-optimal outcome path, but they will
all, by deﬁnition, generate the same reelection probability and expected payoff.14 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
Corollary 1. If   is concave, then the agent-optimal outcome (k 
E,k 
L)=( x ,1  x ),
where x  maximizes  (x,1  x) over x   [0,1], and the expected payoff to any legislator
in any agent-optimal outcome path is b/[1    (x ,1  x )].
Proof. In the appendix.  
Thus, if   isconcave, thentheagent-optimaloutcomepathinvolvesthelegislators
allocating, in each period, x  to EARLY and 1   x  to LATE irrespective of which
type makes the offer (hence the irrelevance of the value of  ). We now show that
with a slightly stronger recency effect than what is captured in A2, it follows that
x  < 0.5:
Corollary 2. The agent-optimal outcome, deﬁned by x  in Corollary 1, is strictly less than
one-half if  (0,1) >  (0.5,0.5).
Proof. In the appendix.  
The inequality in Corollary 2 entails a strengthening of recency bias. Together
with concavity of  , it implies A2. In words it says not only is it better to get the
whole cake when LATE rather than EARLY (A2); it is also better to get the whole
cake when LATE than half a cake each period. When this stronger condition of re-
cency holds, then there will be a strict “back loading” of the cake in order to answer
the principal’s query, “What have you done for me lately?”
A main, general message that we have established in this section is that when
legislators possess all the information they need about history, they can engage
in intertemporal cooperation: agent-optimal outcome paths can be sustained in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium. It was moreover shown that such cooperation does
not depend on the details of the institutional structure such as the allocation of pro-
posal power.
4. PROCEDURAL RELEVANCE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
Wenowconsiderthebaselinemodelwiththedefaultinformationalregime(A6)in
whichlegislatorshaveimperfectinformationaboutthehistoryofplayinanyperiod.
We establish, as the main result of this section, that in any pure-strategy equilibrium,
legislators use Markov strategies. Thus, none of the equilibria described in section 3
hold here, and intertemporal cooperation is unsustainable in equilibrium. We then
characterizetheuniquepure-strategyequilibrium(necessarilyinMarkovstrategies)
and establish the following key message: with imperfect information, the structure of
procedural rules matters, as does the nature of the reelection probability function. This
conclusion is to be contrasted with the opposite conclusion when legislators possess
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There are no proper subgames in the baseline model with A6. As such we can-
not use the SPE concept. But, as is now well-established, it is desirable to work
nonetheless with a solution concept that embodies the general notion of sequential
rationality, which is the central element of the SPE concept. In the context of our
stochastic game, the sequential rationality concept requires that in any period t and
for any observed history, each legislator’s actions are ex-post optimal (i.e., they maxi-
mize his expected payoff from that period onwards). We deﬁne a sequentially rational,
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium) to be a pure strategy,
adopted by all legislators, which is sequentially rational.16 We now state the main
result of this section:
Proposition 2 (Structure of equilibria with imperfect information). Given Assump-
tions 4, 6 and 7, any pure-strategy equilibrium is a Markov pure strategy.
Proof. In the appendix. It may be noted that the proof is a straightforward adapta-
tion of Bhaskar’s (1998) proof of his Proposition 1 (which parallels this result).  
This remarkable and unexpected result implies that with imperfect information
about the history of play, equilibria in which a legislator uses a non-Markov (his-
tory dependent) strategy cannot exist; that is, any strategy in which a legislator
conditions his current actions on payoff-irrelevant past actions cannot be part of an
equilibrium. This means that none of the equilibria described in section 3 can hold
here — intertemporal cooperation is unsustainable in equilibrium when legislators
have imperfect information.
We have formalized the notion of imperfect information about history in a par-
ticular manner, as deﬁned in A6. As noted earlier, this would be satisﬁed if, for
example, legislators have ﬁnite memory. The method of proof of Proposition 2 re-
lies crucially on the implied feature that information about an action in period t is
lost for sure after a ﬁnite number of periods; this allows us to deploy a backward
induction argument to establish that equilibrium actions in any period after t + 1
cannot be conditioned on period-t actions.
It may also be noted that the result of Proposition 2 does not use A1-A3, so it
carries over to richer environments (e.g., to multi-person legislatures as we show in
16To simplify the formal analysis, we assume that the legislators in period t know the amount of cake
the period-t LATE legislator obtained in period t 1 (which comprises the payoff-relevant bits of the
history at the beginning of period t); note this means that T in A6 is strictly greater than t + 1. Given
this, we do not need to invoke any beliefs regarding past actions in deﬁning and implementing this
equilibrium concept. For example, we do not need to employ the relatively more complex sequential
equilibrium concept. Our adopted solution concept is essentially the same as used in Bhaskar (1998).16 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
section 6). Finally, note that any reﬁnement of our equilibrium concept will not, by
deﬁnition, sustain non-Markov equilibria involving intertemporal cooperation.17
Given Proposition 2, the set of pure-strategy equilibria of our baseline model with
imperfect information is identical to the set of pure-strategy equilibria in Markov
strategies:
Proposition 3 (Unique Markov equilibrium, ME). If the probability of reelection   sat-
isﬁes Assumptions 1, 4 and 7, then the following strategy, adopted by all legislators, is the
unique pure-strategy ME. A legislator accepts any offer when EARLY and any offer when
LATE. When making an offer, either when EARLY or when LATE, he demands the whole
unit-size cake. The expected payoff to a legislator when EARLY associated with this equilib-
rium is
P(1,1)=
b
1    (1,1)
,
where  (1,1) is obtained by setting kE = kL = 1 in (1).
Proof. In the appendix.  
Notice that the unique equilibrium expected payoff to a legislator P(1,1) depends
on   (through  (1,1)). The following corollary provides a characterization of the
value of  which maximizes P(1,1):
Corollary 3. Assume that   satisﬁes Assumption 2. Let     denote the value of   which
maximizes the expected payoff P(1,1) of a legislator in the unique ME. If  (0,1)  
[ (1,1)+ (0,0)]/2 then     = 0; Otherwise 0 <     < 0.5, with     decreasing in the
difference  (0,1)    (1,0).
Proof. In the appendix.  
Thus, if legislators have imperfect information about the history of play, then they
would like the procedural rules to be such that a relatively greater amount of bar-
gaining power is allocated to LATE legislators (and in some cases all the bargaining
power). With perfect information, legislators are less concerned with procedural
structure but that is far from the case with imperfect information. This point can
be seen quite starkly in the case when   is concave and  (0,1) >  (0.5,0.5): With
perfect information, legislators are indifferent to the value of   (Corollary 1), but
17While ﬁnite memory is a reasonable assumption, it would be interesting to know whether the
conclusion of Proposition 2 is robust to alternative formalizations of imperfect information, such as
when information is lost gradually and stochastically (for example, because each legislator knows
the full history from the point at which he is ﬁrst elected into the legislature). In subsection 8.4 we
address this issue and show that our results are indeed robust to such an alternative formalization of
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with imperfect information, they would like to allocate all power to LATE legisla-
tors (Corollary 3; under the assumptions on   in this case, the inequality stated in
the corollary is satisﬁed and hence     = 0).
The take-home points of this section are that legislators, in contexts of imper-
fect information, are restricted to Markov strategies in equilibrium, that they cannot
sustain intertemporal cooperation, that they are no longer indifferent to procedural
arrangements ( ), and that they mutually prefer procedures that advantage the leg-
islator closest to his contract-renewal date. A fascinating consequence of these con-
clusions is the expectation of greater distributive volatility in imperfect-information
settings than when agents can condition on history. Agents obtain either the whole
cake or none of it each period, outcomes that alternate as a function of recognition
probabilities.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Given the results derived in sections 3 and 4, we can now resolve the founding
fathers’ problem (the principals in period  1) of selecting the procedural rule (value
of  ) and choosing between the default informational regime of imperfect informa-
tion (A6 holds) and instituting a mechanism to endow legislators with information
about history (A5 holds). We will establish two main results.
First, the founding fathers will institute a mechanism that endows legislators
(agents) with enough information about the history of actions taken in the legis-
lature to facilitate intertemporal cooperation. Transparency of agent actions amongst
the agents is all important for the founding fathers because it enables agents to hold
each other to account. This key insight is shown to be quite robust (including
renegotiation-proof).
Second, in some circumstances the founding fathers are indifferent to the struc-
ture of the procedural rules. Given that agents will be endowed with perfect in-
formation about the history of play (the ﬁrst result in this section), the founding
fathers do not care how proposal power is allocated between agents. But there are
conditionsunderwhichaspeciﬁcproceduralrule(combinedwithagentspossessing
perfect information about history) would deliver the best outcome for the founding
fathers.
As explained in section 2.5, we identify one inﬁnitely lived principal per district,
and so in what follows we use the terms founding fathers and principals inter-
changeably.
5.1. Theﬁrst-best. The ﬁrst-best outcome path for the principalsis the one that max-
imizes their joint interests. The ﬁrst-best serves as the ideal from the principals’
perspective. Let Ui
E   Ui
E(x, y) and Ui
L   Ui
L(x, y) respectively denote the present
discounted expected payoffs to the principal from district i depending on whether18 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
her period-0 legislator is EARLY or LATE. In each period t   0, the EARLY legis-
lator demands x if making a proposal (with probability  ) and the LATE legislator
demands y when proposing (with probability (1   ). For each i = 1,2, Ui
E and Ui
L
respectively satisfy the following Bellman equations:
Ui
E =
 
 ui(x)+(1   )ui(1   y)
 
+ i
 
 ui(1   x)+(1   )ui(y)
 
+ 2
i Ui
E, and
(2)
Ui
L =
 
 ui(1   x)+(1   )ui(y)
 
+ i
 
 ui(x)+(1   )ui(1   y)
 
+ 2
i Ui
L.
(3)
Straightforward computations show that the expected value, Ui
P   Ui
P(x, y), is:
(4) Ui
P  
Ui
E + Ui
L
2
=
 
 
ui(x)+ui(1   x)
 
+(1   )
 
ui(y)+ui(1   y)
 
2(1   i)
.
Notice that since ui is strictly concave, Ui
P is maximized at (x, y)=( 0.5,0.5). This
makes sense: since each principal has strictly concave preferences, she prefers to
smooth out her consumption over time. Alas, the partition of the cakes is not deter-
mined directly by principals, but rather by legislators in the legislative body. They
may, however, be constrained constitutionally in various ways. Indeed, while the
principals do not choose the allocations of the cakes, we can ask which institutional
structures would maximize their joint expected payoffs subject to the constraint that
once these arrangements are chosen, the amounts of cake that they respectively
receive are determined by the legislators’ equilibrium behaviour (as described in
Propositions 1–3). We now proceed to answer this question.
5.2. Principal-optimality behind the veil. We study the choices in period  1 that
are made by principals in ignorance of which district’s period-0 legislator will be
EARLY and which will be LATE. These constitutional choices determine the allo-
cation of proposal power,     [0,1], and the information environment (a selection
between staying with the default informational regime of imperfect information –
A6 – and instituting a mechanism to endow legislators with enough information to
sustain cooperation – A5). It follows from Propositions 1–3 that the equilibrium ex
ante (behind the veil) expected payoffs to principal i with imperfect information is
Ui
P(1,1), and with perfect information is Ui
P(k 
E,k 
L). Since ui is strictly concave, the
latter strictly exceeds the former. Hence we have our ﬁrst main result of this section:
Proposition 4 (Agent transparency). Given Assumptions 1–4 and 7, and with constitu-
tional choices made behind the veil, the founding fathers (or principals from both districts)
strictly prefer to institute a mechanism that would endow legislators with perfect informa-
tion about history (rather than retain the default informational regime of imperfect informa-
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This means that the principals will at the constitutional moment institute mecha-
nisms to ensure that the history of actions taken in the legislature are always avail-
able for inspection by any legislator. Whether they are also available for inspection
by other parties (e.g., by the principals themselves, or the media) is not an issue of
any relevance. Here, what matters is transparency of actions amongst the legislators.
This notion of transparency differs from the standard interpretation in principal-
agent relationships in which the agent’s action is made known to the principals or
other third parties in order to enable them to hold the agent to account.18 Our result
(relevant, of course, only in multi-agent environments) concerns the notion of agents
holding each other to account.
Next we turn to the procedural rules (proposal power) as parameterized by  that
maximize the joint ex ante expected payoffs of the principals. Given Proposition 4,
this would be the value of  that solves the following maximization problem:
(5) U 
P   max
  [0,1]
 
U1
P(k 
E,k 
L)+U2
P(k 
E,k 
L)
 
.
Without additional assumptions on   (which determines k 
E and k 
L), it is in general
not possible to solve this problem. In general, Ui
P(k 
E,k 
L) is potentially sensitive to
 , and hence one or both principals may have a strict preference for a speciﬁc value
of  . The set of solutions of (5) may be a proper subset of [0,1], and possibly there
may be a unique   which maximizes the principals’ joint ex ante expected payoffs.
In that case, principals not only will want to ensure that legislators can hold each
other to account (Proposition 4), but also will design the legislature in such a way
that proposal power is allocated appropriately.
However, when   is concave it is easy to solve this problem. In this case, k 
E is
independent of  , and k 
L = 1   k 
E (cf. Corollary 1). Hence, it can be veriﬁed that
this implies for both i = 1,2,Ui
P(k 
E,k 
L) is independent of . Consequently, we have:
Proposition 5 (Procedural irrelevance). Given Assumptions 1–4 and 7,   concave, and
constitutionalchoicesmadebehindtheveil, thefoundingfathersdonotcareaboutprocedural
rules; that is, any    [0,1] maximizes their joint ex ante expected payoffs.
Thus, combining Propositions 4 and 5, we have established that if   is concave,
then principals want to ensure that legislators can hold each other to account, no
more no less; they do not care about the allocation of proposal power.19 Taking
18See, for example, Besley (2006) and Prat (2005).
19We noted earlier that the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 5) requires record-keeping by each
chamber. It is also relevant to observe that it does not prescribe other features of legislative organi-
zation. In particular, also in Article I, Section 5, it states that “Each House may determine the Rules
of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member.”20 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
the principle of delegation as fundamental — that the allocations of the cakes are
decided by legislators in the legislative body — the best that the principals can do
in terms of maximizing their joint ex ante expected payoffs (when   is concave) is
to institute a mechanism that endows legislators with all the information they need
to sustain intertemporal agent cooperation.
5.3. Renegotiation-proofness and ex post optimality. In this subsection, we ad-
dress the following two different but related questions concerning legislative insti-
tutional structures that maximize the principals’ joint ex post expected payoffs. “Ex
post” means after the veil is lifted (i.e., immediately after it is randomly determined
which district’s period-0 legislator is EARLY and which is LATE):
• Renegotiation-Proofness. Can the two principals mutually beneﬁt from amend-
ing the institutional structure of the legislative body that was determined behind the
veil during the constitutional moment in period  1?
• Ex Post Optimality. If the constitutional choices are determined immediately
after the veil is lifted (and not behind the veil), then what values would be selected
by the two principals?
Letting district i’s period-0 legislator be the one randomly selected to be EARLY
and district j’s LATE, it follows that the principals’ joint ex post expected pay-
offs with imperfect information and perfect information are respectively Ui
E(1,1)+
U
j
L(1,1) and Ui
E(k 
E,k 
L)+U
j
L(k 
E,k 
L). The latter joint expected payoff is strictly
greater than the former (since u1 and u2 are strictly concave), and hence Proposi-
tion 4 is robust:
Proposition 6. Given Assumptions 1–4 and 7:
(i) If the constitutional choices are made after the veil is lifted, principals from both districts
strictly prefer to institute a mechanism that would endow legislators with perfect informa-
tion about history.
(ii) If the constitutional choices are made behind the veil, then the mechanism instituted to
endow legislators with perfect information is renegotiation-proof (i.e., the principals cannot
mutually beneﬁt from discarding it once the veil is lifted).
GivenProposition6(i), theexpost, principal-optimalallocationofproposerpower
is the value of  that solves the following maximization problem:
(6) max
  [0,1]
 
Ui
E(k 
E,k 
L)+U
j
L(k 
E,k 
L)
 
,
where district i’s period-0 legislator is the one randomly selected to be EARLY and
district j’s LATE. Using (2)–(4), it is straightforward to verify that if the two princi-
pals have identical preferences, then the solutions of the two maximizations prob-
lems, (5) and (6), are identical, and hence the ex ante optimal and ex post optimalINFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 21
procedural rules are the same. But if the players’ preferences differ (either with re-
spect to their per-period utility functions and/or their rates of time preference), then
the ex ante optimal and ex post optimal allocations of proposer power can differ. Of
course, there will be circumstances under which they do not (e.g., when   is con-
cave; cf. Proposition 5, which carries over to the ex post optimality case). Similarly,
the ex ante optimal allocation of proposal power is in general vulnerable to mu-
tually beneﬁcial renegotiation except when the principals’ preferences are identical
and/or   is concave.
6. MULTI-PERSON LEGISLATURES
6.1. Preliminaries. Wehavedevelopedabaselinemodelofstaggered-termprincipal-
agent relationships in the previous four sections. This baseline model examines the
simplest case — two agents who come up for renewal at different dates based on
retrospective assessment of their performance by their respective principals. We de-
rived equilibrium results under two informational regimes, and then stepped back
to ask how principals would structure interactions in the ﬁrst instance.
Our results extend naturally to more general circumstances as we demonstrate
in the present section. The baseline model partitioned agents in each period into
two classes, EARLY and LATE. Now we consider the general case of M classes.20
In period 0 each agent is assigned randomly a class. The agent in class i serves
M   i + 1 periods (i = 1,2,3,..., M). Each renewed or newly appointed agent then
serves a full M-period term. If an agent is in class i < M in period t, then he is in
class i + 1 in period t + 1. An agent in class M in period t is in the ﬁnal period of
his term; hence if he is reelected at the end of period t, then he is in class 1 in period
t + 1.
As in the baseline model, agent renewal is based on performance during the pe-
riods of his service. The bargaining is, as before, over a unit-size cake each period.
However, now we assume a rule according to which a decision is taken to accept a
proposal on the table that may range from simple majority rule up to unanimity.
Somewhat counterintuitively, we ﬁrst consider four or more agents, showing how
our main results from the baseline model extend to these cases. We separate out the
three-agent case which we take up last. The reason for this treatment has to do with
the issue of pivotalness. We had shown in the two-agent case with perfect informa-
tion that an agent-optimal outcome can be sustained as a SPE through an optimal
penal code (worst SPE). We develop a similar result in the case of four or more
agents. To illustrate, consider four agents, perfect information, and simple majority
20We assume one agent per class, but then comment on how our results extend to ni agents in the ith
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rule (hence the support of three agents is required to accept a proposed division of
the cake). Suppose behavior is on the agent-optimal path when a unilateral devia-
tion occurs by agent i, moving play onto his worst punishment path, Qi. Suppose
also that i, suffering under this worst-SPE punishment, is randomly recognized and
makes a deviant offer especially attractive to the agent in his last period. This is
tempting to that agent. But since — given the SPE concept which requires equi-
librium actions to be immune to proﬁtable unilateral deviations — all other agents
are expected to continue playing their equilibrium actions associated with the path
Qi (which involves them rejecting the deviant offer), the tempted agent will not be
pivotal. So succumbing to the temptation is not proﬁtable. It is because of this non-
pivotalness that establishing the existence of worst SPE punishment paths for the
case of four or more agents is straightforward. The three-agent case requires sepa-
rate treatment precisely because, on the punishment path Qi, if i makes an attractive
proposal to another agent, that agent would be pivotal under simple majority rule,
and so he might well be tempted to defect, making the existence of worst SPE pun-
ishment paths a more challenging exercise. These distinctions will become clear in
the development below.
The structure and timing of our extended baseline model to multi-person legis-
latures is as in the baseline model, illustrated in Figure 1. In the next subsection,
we study the extended baseline model with M principals and M agents, where each
agent (legislator) represents a distinct principal (electoral district) and is in a class
on his own; a full term of ofﬁce is M periods. This perfectly symmetric set-up allows
us to focus attention on the novel element of pivotalness (or otherwise) that arises
when M > 2. The asymmetric set-up in which each principal i (i = 1,2,..., M) can
have ni agents represent it in the legislative body and for them to be in potentially
different classes raises further issues (such as whether or not principal i can distin-
guish the performances of his ni agents) and as such we take up this more general
case in subsection 6.3.
6.2. The perfectly symmetric extended framework. At the beginning of period 0,
M legislators are elected, one from each of the separate electoral districts, and ran-
domly allocated into the M classes. The probability that a legislator is reelected is
 (x1, x2,...,xM) (orsimply  (x)), where xt   [0,1] istheamountofcakethathede-
livered to his principal in period t of his most recent term in ofﬁce, t = 1,2,..., M).21
For the time being we make no assumptions on   as these will differ according to
whether M   4 or M = 3. Let  i denote the probability with which a legislator
from class i is selected to make an offer of the unit-size cake, where  i   [0,1] and
 
M
i=1 i = 1. An offer is a partition of the cake amongst the M legislators. If it
21Note that for a period-0 legislator put in class i   2, xt = 0 for t = 1,...,i   1, by deﬁnition.INFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 23
is accepted by q or more legislators, then the cake is partitioned according to the
proposed offer; otherwise no principal receives any cake in the period in question
(where q   (M/2)+1 if M is even, and q   (M + 1)/2 if M is odd).22
As in the baseline model, each agent receives a ﬁxed payoff of b > 0 for each
period of ofﬁce, and principal i’s utility from consumption c is ui(c), where ui is
strictly increasing and strictly concave.
We ﬁrst show that when legislators have perfect information about the history of
play, then any agent-optimal outcome path can be sustained in a SPE for any class-
contingent distribution of bargaining power. Given the symmetric and stationary
structure of this extended baseline model, an agent-optimal outcome path is one in
which in each period, the legislator who is randomly selected to propose, offers a
partition   x
i if he belongs to class i (i = 1,2,..., M), where these M vectors maximize
a legislator’s expected probability of reelection.23
Proposition 7 (Perfect information in multi-person legislatures). Suppose that at the
constitutionalmomentinperiod 1, theprincipalshaveinstitutedamechanismthatendows
legislators with perfect information about history in the perfectly symmetric, multi-person
legislative body with M legislators. Furthermore, assume that   is non-decreasing in each
of its M arguments.
(a) If M   4, then the agent-optimal outcome is a SPE.
(b) If M = 3, then the agent-optimal outcome is a SPE provided   satisﬁes the following
three inequalities:  (0,0.5,0.5)    (1,0,0),  (0.5,0,0.5)    (0.5,1,0) and
 (0.5,0.5,0)
 (0.5,0.5,1)
 
1    (0.5,0.5,0.5)
1    (0,0,0)
.
Proof. In the appendix.  
The key aspect of the proof involves the construction of M worst SPE punishment
paths, which extend those used in section 3 for the two-agent case. Notice that
when M   4, the existence of the agent-optimal SPE is obtained under extremely
mild conditions on  . We only require that   be non-decreasing (which extends
A1). But when M = 3, we require   also to satisfy three inequalities (as stated in
Proposition 7); the ﬁrst two capture recency effects while the third has implications
for the magnitudes of the reelection probabilities. The reason for this non-trivial
difference has already been noted above in subsection 6.1 (arising due to the issue
22It may be noted that the parameter q — the exact quota in the multi-member legislature — does
not play any signiﬁcant role in the analysis. As such, allowing it to be chosen by the founding fathers
at the constitutional moment in period  1 would not generate anything of interest.
23If   is concave, then (like in the two-agent case; cf. Corollary 1) an agent-optimal outcome is
characterized by a single, class-independent, partition of the unit-size cake, denote it by   x, which
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of pivotalness), and can be seen formally in the proof of this proposition. We note
that in either case the agent-optimal outcome is being sustained as a SPE for any
class-contingent distribution of bargaining power (just like in the two-agent case),
i.e., for any feasible  =(  1, 2,..., M).
We now turn attention to the default informational regime when agents have im-
perfect information. In this case, the results of section 4 extend straightforwardly
for any M   3 (it is no longer necessary to treat the M = 3 case distinctly).24
Proposition 8 (Imperfect information with multi-person legislators). Given Assump-
tions 4, 6, and 7, and assuming that   is nondecreasing, the following strategy, adopted
by all legislators, is the unique equilibrium. A legislator, irrespective of the class he is in,
always accepts any offer and always demands the whole unit-size cake.
Proof. In the appendix.  
Propositions 7 and 8 extend the arguments and the results of section 5 to the M-
principal, M-agent case. The assumption that each principal has strictly concave
preferences plays, as before, a key role. The ﬁrst-best, or ideal solution for each
principal, is the same, and it involves splitting each period’s unit-size cake equally
amongst them (i.e., in each period, each principal is allocated a share 1/M of the
cake). But this is not directly achievable since cake allocations are determined by
the legislators. The main results are as follows.
The principal-optimal outcome behind the veil has the fundamental feature that
principals strictly prefer to institute a mechanism that endows legislators with in-
formation about history (rather than have them operate in the default informational
regime of imperfect information). This feature is renegotiation-proof and ex post
optimal. These two results extend Propositions 4 and 6. Of course the assumptions
required for them differ according to whether M = 3 or M   4. Besides the as-
sumptions required for Propositions 7 and 8 above, we require that principals’ have
strictly concave preferences. With respect to the principal-optimal procedural struc-
ture, just like for the two-principal, two-agent case, it is in general not possible to
say much without additional assumptions. For example, if   is concave, then the
conclusion of Proposition 5 carries over.
6.3. Asymmetric multi-person legislatures. We now brieﬂy discuss the more gen-
eral dynamic multi-principal, multi-agent framework in which principal i is rep-
resented in the legislature by ni legislative agents who are potentially in different
24As in the two-agent case, imperfect information is formally deﬁned as in A6. Furthermore, to
simplify the formal analysis we assume that legislators in any period t know the actions taken in the
preceding M periods.INFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 25
classes. One novel issue that this raises is whether or not the principal can distin-
guish the per-period performances of her ni > 1 agents. If all that the principal
observes is the aggregate amount of cake delivered to her district in any period,
but does not observe the contributions of each of her agents, then this complicates
the analysis. It brings into play free-rider and team considerations and the logic of
“credit-claiming”. These issues are outside the scope of this paper, and so we adopt
the assumption that the principal can observe exactly what each legislator delivered
in each period, a reliable credit-claiming technology. This assumption may be ap-
plicable in some contexts but not in others. With this assumption, the probability
of reelection of any legislator can, once again, be conditioned on his performance
during his term in ofﬁce.
There are some other issues that this asymmetric framework raises that are absent
from the analysis conducted thus far. For example, although legislators are assumed
to be identical (have identical preferences and an identical probability of reelection
function  ), the sizes of the M classes would differ in each period, and this would
mean that the outcome path that maximizes the legislators’ joint payoffs would be
asymmetric and relatively more complex than in the symmetric case. If the size
of each class is the same, then the arguments and conclusions reported in subsec-
tion 6.2 carry over with minor modiﬁcations to the assumptions required for them
to hold. But with unequal class sizes the arguments would have to be somewhat
altered.
7. ANA P P L I C A T I O NT OT H EU.S. SENATE
TheUnitedStatesSenate, likemanyoftheworld’supperchambers, isastaggered-
term legislature. Each state sends two senators to the Senate (by the selection of the
state legislature until the beginning of the twentieth century and by popular election
since then). Beginning with the ten initial states which selected senators in May 1789
(the three remaining of the original 13 sending senators shortly thereafter), random
assignment was employed to establish the staggered-term arrangement. Each of the
ten states was randomly assigned to two of three groups, with the proviso that no
state could be twice assigned to the same group. Then each of these groups was
randomly assigned a class (= I, II, II). A designated senator from each state in class I
must vacate his seat after two years, a senator in class II after four years, and those
in class III after six years. A vacated seat is then ﬁlled by the state’s (s)electorate,
so that a third of the seats were ﬁlled every two years and each newly ﬁlled seat
had a term of six years. For example, Maryland may have been assigned to the sec-
ond and third groups. If the second group were randomly assigned class I and the
third class II, then Maryland’s two senators would begin with terms of two years
and four years, respectively. The original 20 senators did not divide evenly into the26 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
three classes — one class was a senator short. When the next admitted state sent two
senators, there would be a double-random drawing, the ﬁrst to determine which of
the two senators would be assigned to the “short” class, and the second to deter-
mine which class the other senator would join. Now there are two “short” classes,
so that the next newest state’s two senators would simply be randomized between
these two classes. This assignment sequence would repeat as new states entered the
union. In this manner a staggered-term legislative chamber was implemented in
accord with constitutional provision, with each class approximately equal. Today,
ﬁfty states supply two senators each with approximately one-third facing reelection
every two years.25
In the modern era politicians are held accountable in the electoral arena by their
respective constituents. They are judged on criteria as diverse as their personal
characteristics (some of which are observable — race, gender, charisma, wealth —
and some of which are not — competence, honesty, intelligence), their ideology (as
measured by their voting records, their speeches, their association with legislative
products or special interests), their party, and their position in the legislature (se-
niority, committee assignments, chairmanships, party and institutional leadership
posts). In our model, we abstract from these features, treating senators as essen-
tially identical agents, distinguished only by their location in the electoral cycle and
their success in the divide-the-cake distributive politics game.
Despite abstracting from the empirical richness of a real legislative body like the
US Senate, we believe we have captured some of its essential features, as the follow-
ing stylized facts suggest:
• Aside from the various appropriations that are mandated by permanent leg-
islation or that accompany new legislation, about 15% of each of the thirteen
separate appropriations bills that is passed each ﬁscal year consists of expen-
ditures devoted to earmarks. These are speciﬁc line items designating a par-
ticular project and an expenditure amount in a particular location (e.g., $3.5
million to expand the visitors center in Yosemite National Park in Califor-
nia). An appropriations subcommittee (the Interior subcommittee, for exam-
ple, has jurisdiction over expenditures in national parks) will be inundated
with as many as 2500 or 3000 such requests from senators in a ﬁscal year,
each request a claim on a small piece of the earmarks budget. (The roughly
25Upper chambers in most national and subnational legislatures employ four-year terms with half
the legislators up for election every two years. However, India’s upper house, the Rajya Sabha,
is a staggered-term legislative body, with one-third of its members elected every two years. A
term of ofﬁce is six years. It differs from the contemporary US Senate in two ways – members
are elected from Indian states by their respective state legislatures (like the pre-twentieth century
US Senate), and the number of members from a state depends on state population (like most lower
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$10 billion Interior appropriation will have approximately $1.5 billion worth
of earmarks, for example). Thus, in the context of each appropriations sub-
committee bill, there is an active “divide-the-earmarks-budget” game. From
conversations with subcommittee staff (personal interviews by one of the
authors), some clear criteria emerge by which winners and losers in a given
ﬁscal year are determined: Priority is given ﬁrst to the requests of senators on
the subcommittee, then senators on the full committee, and ﬁnally senators
“in cycle” (by which is meant senators in the last two years of their six-year
term). Since committee memberships are proxies for agenda power, those
not on the (sub)committee, but in cycle, are effectively given special treat-
ment. The practice of tilting toward those in cycle is a recognition, if not an
institutionalization, of the WHYDFML logic.26
• The allocation of earmark funding is consistent with the equilibrium out-
comes we would expect in a world with recency effects. That politicians
believe they are subject to retrospective assessment, and that this assessment
is indeed biased toward recent performance, is an established stylized fact
in the legislative scholarship ﬁeld. It is exempliﬁed by the (probably apoc-
ryphal) story of the Kentucky senator who is shocked to learn that one of
his reliable constituents might not support him in the upcoming election. In
response to the surprise expressed by the senator, the constituent concedes,
“Sure you got my brother that agricultural subsidy. And you got my grand-
son admitted to the US Military Academy. And you even got my factory a
small military contract. But what have you done for me lately?”
• Because earmarks are thought to be wasteful, often not even passing a simple
beneﬁt-cost test, there are always “reformers” in the legislature who seek to
eliminate them from the appropriations process. Indeed, most of the profes-
sional staffs of appropriations subcommittees dislike earmarks for this rea-
son (plus the fact that they are a time-intensive nuisance). For all these rea-
sons, plus the fact it reduces their discretion, bureaucrats are not keen about
earmarks either. In the 1970s a bold attempt was made by Senator James
Buckley of New York. When an appropriations bill came to the ﬂoor of the
Senate, Buckely introduced amendments to strike 50 projects, one from each
state. Although these amendments were intended to symbolize the proﬂi-
gacy and waste of earmarking, only the amendment striking the project from
New York passed, causing the New York Times to ask “Why is New York State
handicapped by being the only state with but one U.S. senator?” We would
26Empirical evidence for the distinct treatment given senators who are in-cycle is found in Shepsle,
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characterize Buckley’s attempt as an off-the-equilibrium path deviation that
elicited a punishment.
These stylized facts portray a U.S. Senate engaging in distributive politics along
the lines we have described in our theoretical development — overlapping terms,
retrospective assessment, recency bias, and punishment of those seeking to over-
turn equilibrium practices. In addition to these facts, we would call attention to
two key features of the U.S. Senate which, we claim, are consistent with our main
results. The Constitution requires, ﬁrst, the keeping and publishing of a journal, a
daily record of Senate proceedings that records bills and motions introduced, the
speeches and other deliberative acts of the senators, and ﬁnally their votes (Propo-
sition 4). Increasingly, information about activities off the ﬂoor of the Senate, in
its committee and subcommittee rooms, is part of the ofﬁcial record. Second, and
perhaps more remarkable, the Constitution permits senators to make their own pro-
cedural arrangements (Proposition 5). Thus, the constitutional founders imposed
a record-keeping requirement to enhance the availability and reliability of the his-
torical record, but imposed no other constraints on the operation of the legislature.
That is, they encouraged transparency among agents but expressed little interest in
ﬁne-tuning procedural parameters (like ).
8. DISCUSSION
Our approach departs from several conventions in the literature, so we ﬁrst, in
sections 8.1-8.3, provide further elaboration and justiﬁcation on three issues — prob-
abilistic election, retrospective assessment, and recency bias — while at the same
time relating our approach to some of the existing literature. We then, in section 8.4,
show that our main results are robust to an alternative formalization of imperfect
information, one in which information is lost gradually and stochastically. Section
8.5 concludes with a brief discussion of areas for future research.
8.1. Probabilistic election. In our approach agent reappointment is probabilistic.
Exemplars of the agency-theoretic approach to legislative organization — Barro
(1973), Ferejohn (1986, 1999) — utilize uncertainty in a very different way. For them,
an uncertain state of the world affects the productivity of an agent’s effort for his
principal’s welfare. Thus, if x measures agent effort and   is the state (with “good”
states having larger values), then the payoff to the principal is weakly monotonic
in x . The state ( ) is unknown ex ante to both principal and agent, but comes to
be known to the agent by the time he must make his (costly) effort decision (x). Al-
though neither the state nor agent effort is observable to the principal (voter), she
nevertheless makes a deterministic decision about whether to renew the agent’s con-
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exceeds a threshold (optimally determined, and committed to, ex ante in light of the
commonly known probability distribution over ), and replaces him otherwise. She
cannot distinguish the agent’s effort from the state of the world because these ele-
ments are pooled into an undifferentiated performance result. The optimal rule set
by the principal is deterministic: reappoint if performance exceeds a cut-off value;
replace otherwise. Therefore, at the time the agent chooses his effort, he knows with
certainty whether it is worthwhile for him to bear the cost of enough effort so that,
pooled with the state of the world (then known to him), the performance it yields
will exceed the principal’s cut-off requirement. If he concludes that it is not worth-
while, then he will do nothing and not be reappointed. Uncertainty in these models
enters only in the determination of the principal’s optimal cut-off rule. Once the
cut-off threshold is set, the principal’s choice on agent retention is deterministic and
this is fully appreciated by the agent at the time he selects his effort level.
In our model, in contrast, the legislative agent is not able to resolve uncertainty
surrounding his reappointment prospects entirely. At the end of his two-period
term, his reelection depends upon past performance but in no completely discern-
able way (apart from weak monotonicity and recency). Many factors confound the
relationship between performance and reappointment. For example, voters may
participate probabilistically. The choices of those who do participate may be sto-
chastic. The characteristics of an opponent (unmodeled in most approaches in this
literature) may not be known ex ante. Put differently, the agent does not know the
identity of the decisive voter who will determine a renewal decision. There are, in
short, myriad reasons why an agent enters his reappointment phase with some ran-
domness in his fate unresolved. In our model the best he can do is take actions that
increase the likelihood of reappointment.
Thus, we characterize the agent’s optimization problem in terms of a probability-
of-reelection function,  . We have made relatively weak assumptions about this
function (A1-A3). A1, it should be noted, is compatible with the notion of perfor-
mance thresholds so that the accumulation of cake beyond some ﬁxed amount need
not strictly improve reelection probabilities. In the limit, when   = 1 for perfor-
mance exceeding an upper threshold, our formulation approaches the spirit of cut-
off formulations. Indeed, cut-off formulations are special cases of our probabilistic
formulation.27 As is evident in the development in earlier sections, many existence
results depend on nothing stronger than the three assumptions we make. In order
to provide substantive characterizations, however, we often must restrict ourselves
27A slightly different kind of cut-off rule is the threshold contract described in Gersbach and Liessem
(2005). A threshold contract stipulates the minimum performance level an agent must attain in order
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to more speciﬁc classes of  , e.g., a probability-of-reelection function concave in its
arguments.
By not subscripting   we have implicitly assumed that agents share identical
probability-of-reelection functions. In effect, this means that each agent believes
that his principal draws her reappointment choice from a common probability dis-
tribution. This is unrealistically restrictive in contexts in which wealth and tastes
are likely to vary across districts. We have acknowledged this in indexing the utility
function and discount parameter of principals. This and the preceding observation
emphasize the need to elaborate more detailed micro-foundations for  .28
8.2. Retrospective assessment. As in most of the literature, our approach depends
upon retrospective assessment of agents by principals. Although this contrasts with
Downsian approaches to elections in which the promise of future performance is
the coin of the realm (prospective voting), retrospective voting models are now the
conventional approach to this subject. There is both an empirical and a theoreti-
cal literature on elections in which retrospective assessment is taken as unexcep-
tional. In addition to Barro and Ferejohn mentioned above, theoretical contributions
by Austen-Smith and Banks (1989), Banks and Sundaram (1998), Dixit (1995), and
Maskin and Tirole (2004) adopt, without comment, a retrospective point of view as
axiomatic. Theirs are primarily moral hazard frameworks in which retrospective as-
sessments by principals provide ex ante incentives for agents to perform.
29 Fearon
(1999) in contrast raises selection issues, suggesting that elections are chieﬂy about
selecting agent qualities — for example, preferences concordant with those of prin-
cipals or immutable qualities like competence, ability, and honesty. Retrospective
assessment for Fearon involves the aquisition of information by principals about
agent type, allowing principals to update beliefs and reappoint those agents more
likely than potential replacements to possess appropriate attributes. Our model is
more in the moral hazard tradition in which the reelection probability reﬂects in-
centives for agents to perform in a manner desired by principals. Departures from
the wishes of principals may arise, and this is one of the main points of our analy-
sis, because of institutional features of elections — particularly staggered terms that
provide agents with time-dependent considerations at odds with the objectives of
principals.
28We have conceptualized   as an agent’s beliefs about how he will be retrospectively assessed by
his principal, and have assumed that these beliefs are common among agents (as just noted) and
commonly known by both principal and agent. Thus,   is stipulated exogenously. One way to
move beyond this would be to specify a deterministic assessment by principals subject to generic
and idiosyncratic shocks with known probability distributions. We thank Torsten Persson for this
suggestion.
29A recent model of retrospective voting, formalizing earlier arguments of the American political
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There is a large empirical literature in political science on retrospective assess-
ment. The locus classicus of this literature is Fiorina (1981). Kramer (1971) was one of
the earliest to demonstrate a retrospective effect empirically, showing for the US that
stronger economic performance in the year of an election translated into a greater
share of the national vote for the congressional candidates of the incumbent presi-
dent’s party. Tufte (1978) and others experiment with weighted averages of multiple
years worth of past economic performance to operationalize a retrospective effect.
Kiewiet and Udall (1998), on the basis of new data, re-estimate a number of different
speciﬁcations, demonstrating a very robust retrospective effect. As in the theoretical
literature, there is very little attention paid to justifying or explaining retrospective
assessments; researchers are content to demonstrate the existence of such effects.
As Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997: 389) observe, “...retrospective evaluation
of outcomes is a cognitive activity in which people routinely engage, much as they
engage in grammatical speech or in deductive reasoning.” Our approach ﬁts right
into this literature.
8.3. Recency effects. Recency effects in the context of retrospective assessment are
commonly noted in the literature. Levitt (1996), for example, ﬁnds that “...[US]
senators give twice as much weight to (median) constituent preferences in the year
before elections as compared to four years or more before elections.” We assume
a very weak version of recency bias in Assumption 2. (We discuss other versions
shortly.)
In our model principals with concave preferences for the consumption of cake
prefer, subject to discounting, a relatively smooth distribution over the two periods
of an agent’s term. If, ex post, a principal’s actions display a recency bias, as is
evident in the empirical literature, then it is conceivable that there is some incentive
rationale for her acting this way. Perhaps a principal elicits better responses from
an agent when she acts as if she gives greater weight to more recent performance
relative to more distant performance. Our results cast doubt on this belief since (if  
isconcave)arecencybiaswillencourageagentstopreferextraordinaryperformance
(getting more cake) in later periods, even if it means foregoing performance success
earlier. This attenuates the smooth intertemporalprovisionofcake, contraryto what
is preferred by principals.
An alternative consideration, suggested to one of the authors by David Laibson
(personal communication), emphasizes, in the spirit of selection models, informa-
tion extraction as the foundation for recency bias. Recent information is viewed,
rightly or wrongly, as more informative about agent type. Related to this, recent
information may be more easily remembered (whether more reliably informative or
not) or may be given more prominence by the media. Saraﬁdis (2007) presents a32 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
model of memory (of a principal) from which it may be deduced that particular pat-
terns of information transmission from agent to principal — sometimes reﬂecting a
recency effect, sometimes not — are optimal for the agent.
Perhaps the most famous psychological experiments on recency bias are Kah-
neman’s colonoscopy studies (Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, and Redelmeier
1993, Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996, Redelmeier, Katz, and Kahneman 2003).
There it was discovered that patient memories of unpleasant medical procedures
are highly correlated with peak periods of unpleasantness on the one hand, and the
experience in the most recent periods on the other. In particular, they found that a
number of periods of relatively less unpleasant experience tacked on to the end of
the procedure reduced patient retrospective assessment of the unpleasantness, even
if these additional less unpleasant experiences actually lengthened the time of the
procedure.
Thus, while we do not have a good micro-theoretical rationale for recency bias,
there are several useful conjectures and considerable empirical and experimental
evidenceforthebias. Oneoftheinterestingeffectsofrecencybiasisthatdiscounting
by voter-principals is effectively the reverse of ordinary economic discounting. At
the outset of an agent’s two periods of incumbency, for example, he can anticipate
that principals, at the time of a renewal decision, will place at least as much weight
on the agent’s second period performance as on his ﬁrst.30
Finally, we note that there are a variety of ways to specify a recency effect theoreti-
cally. Assumption 2 is, as noted, a very weak requirement of a recency bias. Another
version, mentioned in the discussion of Corollary 3, has  (0,1) >  (0.5,0.5) — in
effect, moving half the cake in a smooth distribution from the early period to the late
increases the renewal likelihood. Perhaps the strongest version would be one which
requires that  (xE   , xL + ) >  (xE, xL) for any (xE, xL) and any 0 <   < xE.
This strong version of recency bias is one in which the probability of reappointment
is strictly increasing in any reallocation of cake from an early period to a late period.
Clearly, repeated application of this deﬁnition yields Assumption 2. It turns out that
this requirement imposes strong restrictions on  .31
30This suggests that the combination of ordinary economic discounting and recency bias produces
inconsistent time preferences: principals have a bias for recent periods over the past. This parallels
the hyperbolic discounting literature (Laibson 1997) in which players have dynamically inconsistent
time preferences because of self-control problems: a principal has a bias for current periods over the
future.
31To illustrate this point suppose that   is an increasing function of  v(xE)+v(xL), where   < 1,
and v is differentiable and increasing. The strong version of recency bias holds if and only if for any
(xE, xL), v (xL) >  v (xE). This, in turn, holds only if minx v (x) >  maxx v (x). But this means
that either v is linear, or if non-linear then   is sufﬁciently small (i.e., the premium on cake obtained
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8.4. Robustnesstostochasticinformationloss. Afundamentalelementofourmodel
is that the default informational regime is one in which legislators have imperfect
information about history. We have conceptualized and formalized “imperfect in-
formation” in a particular manner (cf. A6). As noted earlier, ﬁnite memory implies
it. But A6 would not hold if we were to assume that a legislator knows the full his-
tory since his ﬁrst election but has little information about history before he entered
the legislature. Such a conceptualization of imperfect information would imply that
information about actions taken in any period is lost gradually and stochastically.
The main issue for our argument and results to hold is whether the conclusion of
Proposition 2 carries over. This is because a key element that underlies our argu-
ment and main results is that with imperfect information, intertemporal coopera-
tion is unsustainable in equilibrium (any equilibrium is necessarily Markovian). We
now show that the result stated in Proposition 2 carries over to an alternative for-
malization of imperfect information, one in which information is lost gradually and
stochastically.
Before proceeding further, we note that with the exception of Bhaskar (1998),
the game-theoretic OLG literature has assumed that players have perfect informa-
tion about the history of play. It may also be noted that this literature (including
Bhaskar’s work) is characterized by the feature that each player operates for a ﬁnite
and exogenously givennumber of periods; in contrast, in our multi-principal, multi-
agent model, the number of periods in which an agent operates is endogenously
determined. Furthermore, the focus of this literature has been on establishing folk
theorem type results when players have perfect information in an overlapping-
generations structure. Bhaskar extends this literature by considering the conse-
quences of imperfect information (as formalized by an assumption similar to our
A6) and establishes a result similar to our Proposition 2.
Turning to stochastic information loss, we now assume that:
Assumption 8 (Stochastic information loss). For any t and for any T > t there exists
ap (T;t)   [0,1] such that legislators in period T do not know of the actions taken by the
legislators in periods s   t with probability p(T;t).
Note that when p(T;t)=0 (for all t and T > t), A8 collapses to A5, and when
p(T;t)=1 (for all t and T > t), it collapses to A6. Indeed, A8 encapsulates both
the perfect information setting and the deterministic loss of information scenario
as formally captured by the conceptualization of imperfect information adopted by
Bhaskar (1998) and in this paper (A6).
Our objective now is to in particular establish the robustness of Proposition 2 (and
hence of our main results) to small perturbations in the information structure (and34 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
as such we will show that Proposition 2 carries over when A8 holds with p(T;t)
sufﬁciently close to one). The desired result is as follows:
Proposition 9. Assume that A4 and A8 hold, and there is common knowledge amongst all
legislators about the game itself.
(i) If for any t, p(T;t)   1 as T    , then any pure-strategy equilibrium is a Markov
pure strategy.
(ii) If for any t and any T > t, p(T;t) is sufﬁciently close to zero, then agent-optimal
outcomes are sustainable in a sequentially rational equilibrium.
Proof. In the Appendix.  
Proposition 9 implies that the main results established in this paper are robust
to small perturbations in the information structure. More precisely, and especially,
that if instead of information being lost deterministically (for sure) in ﬁnite time
(A6), it is lost gradually and stochastically but for sure in inﬁnite time, then the re-
sult of Proposition 2 carries over. As such this is useful check on the robustness
of our main insights. Having said this, it would be interesting to explore in future
research the best possible sustainable equilibrium payoffs for arbitrary probability,
p(.;,), functions. The key idea behind the argument leading to Proposition 2 (which
underlies the argument for Proposition 9 as well) is that the sets of legislators op-
erating between any consecutive periods have different information about history
with a relatively high probability, and it is this kind of feature which ensures that
pure strategy equilibria will necessarily be Markovian.
8.5. Directions for future research. We now brieﬂy discuss some possible exten-
sions of our model. First, a key element of our model concerns the modelling of
elections. The previous three subsections above have discussed this issue at some
length, and a central extension would be to provide microfoundations for our prob-
ability of reelection function  .
Second, the economic environment in our model is restrictive, especially since
the per-period surplus is ﬁxed and exogenously given. It would be interesting to
consider not just the partition of a ﬁxed surplus, but also the choice of taxes (hence
the surplus would be endogenously determined) and the allocation of such tax rev-
enue between pork (as in our model), national public goods, and possibly rents for
the legislators (as in Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Such an extension would deliver
results and insights about issues (such as the size of government) which are out-
side of the model studied in this paper. Our main results (principal-optimality of
agent-transparency being a key one) will carry over to some richer economic envi-
ronments, but the opportunity for agents to extract rents (that is, consume some ofINFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 35
the cake themselves) puts them in a more adversarial relationship with their respec-
tive principals and with one another. Transparency may allow principals to keep
an eye on their agents, but it will also enable agents to cooperate at their principals’
expense.
Third, although we adopted a simple bargaining format, it can be established that
our main results are robust to alternative bargaining procedures such as those that
allow legislators to make offers and counter-offers as in Rubinstein (1982) and Baron
and Ferejohn (1989). Of great interest is to make proposal power dependent on the
relative experiences of the legislators. Although this would imply that the allocation
of power is history-dependent (hence signiﬁcantly complicating the analysis), it has
much appeal. This is especially relevant if legislative experience affects the size of
the pork barrel, reelection probabilities, or both.
Fourth, extending the model by allowing for heterogenous agents is obviously an
important direction for future research. Legislative experience is an endogenously
determined source of heterogeneity, which we have suppressed, but clearly plays
an important role in real-world legislatures. There are of course other sources of
exogenously determined heterogeneity such as ability, competence and utility (or
ego-rents) from holding ofﬁce. Interestingly, since b, the ﬁxed payoff received by
a legislator in each term of ofﬁce (which could be interpreted as the sum of salary
and ego-rent), plays no critical role in the analysis and hence in our results, it can
be shown that our main results are robust to allowing legislators to have differing
ego-rents (and hence differing payoffs for holding ofﬁce).
Fifth, inourmodel, thereareconﬂictsofinterestsontheonehandamongstagents,
and on the other hand amongst principals. But the interests of each principal and
his agents are highly correlated in that each agent wants to deliver as much cake
as possible to his principal (in order to maximize his prospects for reappointment),
although agents do exploit the recency bias displayed by principals. It would be in-
teresting to enrich our model by introducing the standard kinds of conﬂict between
a principal and his agent, while at the same time maintaining the other conﬂicts in
this multi-principal, multi-agent environment — for example, by entertaining the
prospect that the size of the surplus depends on the efforts of agents and/or that
agents enjoy some of the cake themselves (as mentioned above).
Last, but not least, it would be interesting and important to extend our normative
analysis of the choices made by the founding fathers at the constitutional moment
in period  1 by allowing for them to select other institutional features such as the
choice of whether to institute staggered or non-staggered terms (see Muthoo and
Shepsle 2008, who study this issue and the choice between a unicameral legislature,
as is implicitly assumed in the current paper, and a bicameral legislature).36 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. To establish that the proposed strategies comprise a SPE, we need only
to check that no legislator can beneﬁt from any one-shot, unilateral deviation from path Qi
(i = 1,2). It is straightforward to see that any one-shot, unilateral deviation from the path
Qi by any legislator from district i does not increase his expected payoff.
Now consider a one-shot, unilateral deviation by a legislator from district j (j  = i) from
path Qi. If, in any period, he either demands less than the whole cake, or rejects the offer of
the whole cake, then he is worse off in that period and there is no effect on his continuation
expected payoff. We now come to the ﬁnal, but critical deviation: Suppose, in some period,
a district j legislator considers, while on path Qi, accepting an offer which gives him a
share x < 1. His expected payoffs from accepting (i.e., deviating) and from rejecting (i.e.,
conforming) such an offer depend on whether in the period in question he is EARLY or
LATE. If he is EARLY, then he will reject the offer if and only if his payoff from rejecting is
greater than or equal to his payoff from accepting, i.e.,
b +  (0,1)
 
b
1    (1,1)
 
  b +  (x,0)
 
b
1    (0,0)
 
.
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that this inequality is satisﬁed. If he is LATE in period t   1,
then he will reject the offer if and only if
b +  (1,0)
 
b
1    (1,1)
 
  b +  (1,x)
 
b
1    (0,0)
 
.
This inequality is satisﬁed for any possible x < 1 if and only if
 (1,0)
 (1,1)
 
1    (1,1)
1    (0,0)
.
Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that this inequality is satisﬁed. A3 implies (making use of A1)
that  (1,1)2    (0,0)2    (1,1)    (0,0). This, in turn, implies that  (0,0)/ (1,1)  
[1  (1,1)]/[1  (0,0)]. The desired conclusion follows since (by A1)  (1,0)    (0,0).32
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the strategies implicitly deﬁned by the following three
paths and three transition rules. The initial path is an agent-optimal path Q(k 
E,k 
L). The
other two paths are Q1 and Q2, and two of the transition rules are T1 and T2, all of which
are associated with the worst SPE (cf. Lemma 1). The third transition rule, denoted by
T(k 
E,k 
L), concerns transitions from Q(k 
E,k 
L): If, when on path Q(k 
E,k 
L), a legislator from
district i (i = 1,2) either makes or accepts a deviant offer, then immediately (before the next
decision node) play moves on to path Qi.33
32If he is LATE in period 0, then he will reject the offer if and only if  (0,0)/ (0,1)   [1  
 (1,1)]/[1    (0,0)]. This is slightly different, but it is satisﬁed by essentially the same argument.
33A deviant offer made by EARLY is a demand x  = k 
E; and a deviant offer made by LATE is a
demand x  = k 
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Given Lemma 1, the proposition follows once we establish that no legislator can beneﬁt
by a one-shot, unilateral deviation from the agent-optimal path Q(k 
E,k 
L). The following
four steps, which establish that, can be easily veriﬁed. First, given Assumption 1, each
legislator’s payoff from accepting the demand associated with the path Q(k 
E,k 
L) is no less
than rejecting it. Second, given Assumption 1, each legislator cannot proﬁt from making a
deviantdemand(eitherwhenheisEARLYorwhenheisLATE).Third, givenAssumptions1
and 2, when a deviant offer is received by EARLY, he cannot proﬁt from accepting it. Fourth,
the same is true when a deviant offer is received by LATE if and only if
 (z,0)
 (z,1)
 
1    (1,1)
1    (0,0)
,
where z   [0,1] denotes the amount of cake he obtained in the preceding period, when he
was EARLY. Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that this inequality is satisﬁed. As shown in the
proof of Lemma 1, A3 implies (making use of A1) that  (0,0)/ (1,1)   [1    (1,1)]/[1  
 (0,0)]. The desired conclusion follows since (by A1)  (z,0)/ (z,1)    (0,0)/ (1,1).
Proof of Corollary 1. Fix an arbitrary pair (kE,kL)   [0,1]   [0,1]. Rewrite  (kE,kL) as
follows:
 (kE,kL)= 
 
  (kE,1 kE)+(1  ) (kE,kL)
 
+(1  )
 
  (1 kL,1 kE)+(1  ) (1 kL,kL)
 
.
Since (by the hypothesis of the corollary)   is concave, it follows that
 (kE,kL)     
 
kE, (1   kE)+(1   )kL)
 
+(1   ) 
 
1   kL, (1   kE)+(1   )kL)
 
.
Using concavity again, it follows that  (kE,kL)    (  x,1    x), where   x =  kE +(1   )(1  
kL). We have thus established that for any (kE,kL)   [0,1]   [0,1] there exists an x   [0,1]
such that  (x,1  x)    (kE,kL). Hence, it immediately follows that
max
0 x 1
 (x,1  x)   max
(kE,kL) [0,1] [0,1]
 (kE,kL),
which establishes the corollary.
Proof of Corollary 2. We argue by contradiction. Thus suppose that x    0.5. Since   is
concave,
 (0.5,0.5)  
 
1
2x 
 
 (x ,1  x )+
 
1  
1
2x 
 
 (0,1).
Since (by deﬁnition)  (x ,1  x )    (0.5,0.5), and (by the hypothesis of the corollary)
 (0,1) >  (0.5,0.5), it follows that  (0.5,0.5) >  (0.5,0.5), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix an arbitrary pure-strategy equilibrium, and ﬁx an arbitrary
period t   1. We will show that the equilibrium actions in period t are conditioned on at
most zt (the amount of cake obtained by the period-t LATE legislator in period t   1), but
on no other bits of observed history, which then establishes the proposition. The argument
involves induction.38 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
First, note that A6(i) implies that there exists a T   t+2 such that the equilibrium actions
in any period from and including period T onwards cannot be conditioned on the actions
taken in any period before and including t 1. Second, we establish the following inductive
step:
Fix an arbitrary period s, where s   t + 1. If the equilibrium actions in any period from and
including period s + 1 onwards are not conditioned on the actions taken in any period before and
including period t   1, then the same is true of the equilibrium actions in period s.
Proof of inductive step. Since s   t+ 1, none of the actions in any period before and including
period t   1 directly affects the payoffs of any legislator in period s. Given this and the hy-
pothesis of the inductive step, it follows that the equilibrium expected payoff to a legislator
from period s onwards does not depend on the actions in any period before and including
t   1. Let ht 1 and h 
t 1 denote two different histories till the end of period t   1 that are
observable to an arbitrary legislator in period s. Furthermore, let h denote a history of ac-
tions observed by the arbitrary legislator between and including periods t and s 1. Hence,
two different observed histories at the beginning of period s are (ht 1,h) and (h 
t 1,h). The
equilibrium expected payoffs to this arbitrary legislator from period s onwards will be the
same following either observed history (for any set of period s actions and given the equi-
librium pure-strategy). Hence, given Assumption 4, the legislator’s equilibrium actions in
period s following these two observed histories are the same. This completes the proof of
the inductive step. It should be noted that the above argument needs a little elaboration.
The role of our particular stage game is crucial, in that it is sequential. To be precise, one
ﬁrst considers the above argument w.r.t. to the responder’s behaviour, and then one rolls
back to consider and show that the proposer would, in equilibrium, make the same offer in
period s following the two observed histories.
Hence, it now follows from the principle of mathematical induction that the equilibrium
actions in any period from and including period t + 1 are not conditioned on the actions
taken in any period before and including period t   1. The desired conclusion follows im-
mediately.
Proof of Proposition 3. A Markov pure strategy for a legislator is made up of two num-
bers, kE and kL, and two functions, fE and fL: ki denotes the legislator’s demand when he is
type i, and fi : [0,1]  { “Accept”,“Reject”} such that fi(x) denotes whether the legislator
accepts or rejects the demand x when he is type i, where i = E, L (E stands for EARLY and
L stands for LATE). Fix an arbitrary Markov equilibrium, and let W denote the expected
payoff associated with this equilibrium to the legislator when he is EARLY at the beginning
of any period (before the proposer is randomly selected). We ﬁrst establish the following
result:
Claim 1. If the probability of reelection   satisﬁes Assumption 1, then a legislator accepts any offer
when EARLY and any offer when LATE.
ProofofClaim1. Toestablishthisclaim, weneedtoshowthatthelegislator, whenEARLYand
when LATE, respectively, accepts any demand x   [0,1] made by the proposer. It follows
from the One-Shot Deviation Principle that the legislator, when EARLY, accepts a demandINFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 39
x   [0,1] if and only if HE(x)   HE(1), where HE(x)=b +[   (1   x, yE)+( 1   ) (1  
x, yL)]W, where
yE =
 
 
 
1   kE if fL(kE)= “Accept”
0 if fL(kE)= “Reject”
and yL =
 
 
 
kL if fE(kL)= “Accept”
0 if fE(kL)= “Reject”.
Assumption 1 implies that for any x   [0,1], HE(x)   HE(1). Hence, this means that
fE(x)= “Accept” for all x   [0,1]. A legislator, when LATE, accepts an offer x   [0,1] if
and only if HL(x)   HL(1), where HL(x)=b +  (z,1  x)W, and z is the amount of cake
received by LATE in the previous period. Assumption 1 implies that for any x   [0,1],
HL(x)   HL(1). Hence, this means that fL(x)= “Accept” for all x   [0,1]. This completes
the proof of Claim 1.
Given Claim 1, it follows from the One-Shot Deviation Principle that the pair (kE,kL)
satisfy the following conditions:
kE   arg max
x [0,1]
 
b+[   (x,1 kE)+(1  ) (x,kL)]W
 
and kL   arg max
x [0,1]
 
b+ (z, x)W
 
,
where z is the amount of cake earned by the LATE legislator a period earlier. That is,
kE   arg max
x [0,1]
 
  (x,1  kE)+(1   ) (x,kL)
 
and kL   arg max
x [0,1]
 
 (z, x)
 
.
Assumptions 1 and 4(b) thus imply that (kE,kL)=( 1,1) is the unique solution.
Proof of Corollary 3. Maximizing P(1,1) over  is equivalent to maximizing  (1,1) over
 . Differentiating  (1,1) w.r.t.  , we obtain:
  (1,1)
  
= 2   + , where
  =  (1,0)+ (0,1)    (1,1)    (0,0) and   =  (1,1)+ (0,0)   2 (0,1).
First, we consider the case in which   > 0. Since   +   =  (1,0)    (0,1) is strictly
negative (by Assumption 2), it follows that  < 0. Now note that 2 +  =   +2[ (1,0) 
 (0,1)], which is strictly negative (by Assumption 2 and since, by hypothesis,   > 0).
Finally note that since   < 0, it follows that  (1,1) is strictly concave in  . Putting these
results together, it follows that  (1,1) is increasing in   over the interval [0,    ), decreasing
over the interval (   ,1] and achieves a maximum at   =    , where     =   /2 . The second
part of the corollary follows immediately since       (0,0.5), and since     is increasing in
 (1,0) and decreasing in  (0,1).
Now consider the case in which     0. We break our argument into three cases. First
suppose that   < 0. This immediately implies that  (1,1) is maximized at   = 0 (since
 (1,1) is in this case decreasing and strictly concave in  ). Now suppose that 0 <   <
  /2. In this case  (1,1) is also maximized at  = 0 (since  (1,1) in this case is decreasing
but strictly convex in  ). Finally suppose that   >   /2. In this case  (1,1) is strictly
convex in  , decreasing in   over the interval (0, ˜  ), achieves a minimum at   = ˜   and is
increasing over the interval (˜  ,1], where ˜   =   /2 . This implies that  (1,1) achieves a40 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
maximum either at  = 0 or at  = 1. The desired conclusion follows immediately, since (by
Assumption 2)  (1,1) takes a higher value at  = 0 than at  = 1.
Proof of Proposition 7. Given the symmetric and stationary structure of the extended
baseline model, the legislators’ joint expected payoffs are maximized with an outcome path
in which in each period the partition of the unit-size cake is contingent on at most the class
of the legislator who is randomly selected to make an offer. Fix such an arbitrary outcome
path, Q(x), where x =( xi)M
i=1 are M partitions of the unit size cake: in each period, with
probability i the legislatorfrom class i (i = 1,2,..., M), who isselectedto propose, offers xi,
whichisacceptedbyalltheotherlegislators. Theexpectedpayofftoanarbitrarylegislatorat
the beginning of his M-period term in ofﬁce from this outcome path is P(x)=b/[1  (x)],
where
 (x)=
M
 
i1=1
M
 
i2=1
...
M
 
iM=1
 
 i1 i2 ... iM
 
 (x
i1
1 , x
i2
2 ,...,x
iM
M)
where for each t  { 1,2,..., M}, the symbol it  { 1,2,..., M} denotes the class of the
legislator who is selected to propose in the t-th period of the legislator’s term in ofﬁce. An
agent-optimal outcome path, Q(  x), is characterized by the M, (M   1)-dimensional vector
  x which maximizes P(x) (or equivalently  (x)). We now proceed to establish (by con-
struction) the existence of a SPE that sustains the agent-optimal outcome path. As in the
two-agent case (and following Abreu (1988)), we construct a SPE deﬁned by an initial path
(which is the agent-optimal outcome path Q(  x)), M district-contingent worst punishment
paths, and M + 1 transition rules (one for each of the M + 1 paths):
Path Qi (i = 1,2,..., M): Each and every legislator from district i always (i.e., in any
period, for any history, and whatever his class) offers yi and accepts any offer, where yi is
the partition of the unit-size cake in which he gets no cake, and every other legislator gets a
share 1/(M   1). Every other legislator always makes the offer yi and only accepts the offer
yi.
Transition rule Ti (i = 1,2,..., M): If, when play is on path Qi, a legislator from district
j either makes a deviant offer (i.e., does not offer yi) or accepts a deviant offer (i.e., accepts
an offer that differs from yi), then immediately play switches to path Qj. For any other
deviation from path Qi, play remains on this path.
Transition rule   T: If, when on path Q(  x), a legislator from district i (i = 1,2,..., M) either
makes or accepts a deviant offer, then immediately play moves on to path Qi.
We ﬁrst establish that no legislator can make a proﬁtable unilateral, one-shot deviation
from path Qi (i = 1,2,..., M). It is straightforward to see that any unilateral, one-shot
deviation from Qi by a legislator from district i does not increase his expected payoff. Now
consider a one-shot, unilateral deviation by a legislator from district j (j  = i) from path Qi.
If, in any period, he either makes a deviant offer, or rejects the offer yi, then he is worse off in
that period and his continuation expected payoff decreases (as play will have moved onto
path Qj).
We now come to the ﬁnal, but critical deviation: Suppose, in some period, a district j
legislator considers, while on path Qi, accepting a deviant offer y  = yi. We divide theINFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 41
argument according to whether M   4 or M = 3. First suppose M   4. In that case, since
he is not pivotal (the deviant offer will be rejected in equilibrium by all the other players),
whether he unilaterally deviates (accepts the deviant offer) or conforms (and rejects it), the
amount of cake he obtains in this period is the same (i.e., zero) but his continuation payoffs
differ since in the former case play moves onto path Qj while in the latter case play stays on
path Qi. The assumption that   is nondecreasing in each of its arguments implies that the
legislator in question is strictly better off conforming and rejecting the deviant offer.
Now suppose M = 3. In this case he would be pivotal, and he may have an incentive
to accept the deviant offer (if it is sufﬁciently attractive). There will be three incentive-
compatibility conditions that need to hold (corresponding to the three possible classes to
which the legislator belongs when he considers the deviant offer) in order for it to be the
case that he would reject the deviant offer. Since the most attractive deviant offer is one in
which he is offered the whole cake, the three conditions corresponding to when he is in class
1 (EARLY), class 2 (MIDDLE), or class 3 (LATE) are respectively
b +  (0,0.5,0.5)
 
b
1    (0.5,0.5,0.5)
 
 b +  (1,0,0)
 
b
1    (0,0,0)
 
b +  (0.5,0,0.5)
 
b
1    (0.5,0.5,0.5)
 
 b +  (0.5,1,0)
 
b
1    (0,0,0)
 
b +  (0.5,0.5,0)
 
b
1    (0.5,0.5,0.5)
 
 b +  (0.5,0.5,1)
 
b
1    (0,0,0)
 
.
The conditions on   stated in the proposition imply that these three incentive constraints
are satisﬁed. Finally, using similar arguments to those used here to establish that the pun-
ishment path Qi is subgame perfect, it is easy to verify that the agent-optimal path Q(  x) is
subgame perfect. This then concludes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 8. It is trivial to verify that the stationary strategy described in the
proposition, when adopted by all legislators is an equilibrium. It is straightforward to ex-
tend the arguments in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 4 and establish that there does not
exist any other equilibrium (by ﬁrst establishing that in any pure-strategy equilibrium, a leg-
islator uses a Markov pure strategy, and then establishing that the only Markov equilibrium
is the one described in the proposition).
Proof of Proposition 9. We provide an informal sketch of the main elements of the argu-
ment for part (i); the key elements for the argument of part (ii) are similar. Fix an arbitrary
pure-strategy equilibrium, and ﬁx an arbitrary time t. We will show that the equilibrium ac-
tions in period t are conditioned on at most zt (the amount of cake obtained by the period-t
LATE legislator in period t   1), but on no other bits of observed history, which then estab-
lishes the desired result.42 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
The central part of the argument involves showing that there exists a period T > t such
that the legislators in period T will choose, in equilibrium, not to condition their period-T ac-
tions on the actions taken in any period before and including t   1. Having established that
(which is essentially establishing that A6 emerges in equilibrium), the remainder of the ar-
gument is a backward induction argument exactly along the lines of the proof of Proposition
2.
Given A8, in general it is the case that any legislator in any period T > t will, with
some probability, know actions taken in period s < t. As such, legislators can, with such
probability, condition their equilibrium actions on payoff-irrelevant bits of the observed his-
tory (since there is a positive probability that such history is common knowledge especially
amongst the sets of legislators operating between any two consecutive periods). Any gain
for an arbitrary legislator from doing so, in some arbitrary period T > t, is secured in a
subsequent period (since the whole point of doing so is to inﬂuence the behaviour of fu-
ture legislators). However, using A4, it follows that there is unique short-run best action
for the legislator in period T. This, in turn, implies that deviation from such action is costly
to the legislator in period T. Consequently, when p(T;t) is sufﬁciently large, the expected
(future) gain to a legislator in period T from conditioning his period-T action on payoff-
irrelevant bits of history can be made smaller than the loss incurred in period T from such
conditioning. [The intuition for this argument is formally equivalent to having a sufﬁciently
small discount rate; as is well-known, in that case only Markov strategies can be part of a
subgame perfect equilibrium in inﬁnitely-repeated games.] The desired conclusion is im-
mediate from the hypothesis of part (i) since it implies that for the appropriate, sufﬁciently
large p > 0 there exists a T  > t such that for any T > T , p(T;t) > p.
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